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1  The Coast Guard is to operate as a service within the Navy upon declaration of war or when
the President directs, until the President by executive order transfers it back to DoT (14 USC 3).
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Summary
The Administration’s proposal to create a new Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) would transfer the Coast Guard from the Department of Transportation (DoT)
to DHS.  Whether to transfer the Coast Guard to DHS was one of the more significant
items of congressional debate on the merits of the Administration’s reorganization
proposal.  The two principal homeland security reorganization bills – H.R. 5005 (passed
by the House on July 26, 2002) and Senate Amendment SA4471 (filed on September
3, 2002) – would transfer the Coast Guard to DHS.  The Coast Guard’s homeland
security operations raise other potential issues for Congress as well.  This report will be
updated as events warrant.
Background
The Coast Guard in Brief.  The Coast Guard, the federal government’s principal
maritime law-enforcement agency, is a military service and a branch of the armed forces
that normally operates within DoT.1  It has about 37,000 active-duty uniformed personnel,
about 6,000 civilian personnel, about 8,000 reserve uniformed personnel, and an FY2002
budget of $5.702 billion.  It performs a  variety of missions that it groups into five
fundamental roles – maritime security, maritime safety, maritime mobility, protection of
natural resources, and national defense.
Homeland-Security Operations After September 11, 2001.  In response to
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Coast Guard took actions to create the
largest port-security operation since World War II.  Coast Guard cutters and aircraft were
diverted from more distant operating areas to patrol U.S. ports and coastal waters.  The
Coast Guard established and enforced security zones to protect Navy ships and bases.
Coast Guard personnel began boarding and inspecting inbound vessels, escorting cruise
ships into and out of port, and escorting oil tankers into and out of Valdez, Alaska.  The
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Coast Guard instituted new regulations requiring inbound ships to provide 96-hour (as
opposed to the previous 24-hour) advance notice of arrival, to provide more time to board
and inspect vessels.  Four of the Coast Guard’s 6 Port Security Units (PSUs)2 were
activated and assigned to help protect ports.  And Coast Guard sea marshals began
boarding and riding inbound commercial ships.  To help implement these actions, the
Coast Guard initially activated 2,600 of its 8,000 reservists.  The Coast Guard has since
reduced this figure to 858 (as of October 2, 2002).
The expansion of Coast Guard homeland-security operations led to a major
reshuffling of the service’s mission priorities.  Port-security operations, which had
accounted for about 1%-2% of all Coast Guard operations prior to September 11, 2001
increased to 56% of all operations by October 9, 2001.  To accommodate this expansion,
significant reductions were made to operations in other missions, including alien migrant
interception, recreational boating safety, fisheries-enforcement, counter-drug operations,
and aids to navigation.  As part of its effort to move toward what Coast Guard officials
call the “new normalcy” in Coast Guard operations  (i.e., the new, post-September 11,
2001 status quo for the service), the Coast Guard is reducing is port-security operations
toward a goal of 20%-25% of all operations.  This reduction will permit the Coast Guard
to return assets to other Coast Guard missions, but performance of other missions in some
cases may remain below pre-September 11, 2001 levels.
Resources vs. Missions Prior to September 11, 2001.  Even before
September 11, 2001, the Coast Guard appeared hard-pressed to perform all its missions
at desired levels with available assets and resources.  Many of the service’s cutters are old,
expensive to operate and maintain, and not well suited for some of the missions they
undertake.  Some Coast Guard units have very high operational tempos.  The service has
experienced difficulties in recent years in retaining sufficient numbers of experienced
personnel and maintaining some of its aircraft at desired levels of readiness.
Prior to September 11, 2001 insufficient funding to operate Coast Guard assets to
their full potential was a recurrent issue – the Coast Guard has received seven emergency
supplemental appropriations in the past 10 years.  Operations of some ships and aircraft
had to be reduced by 10% for part of FY2001 due to lack of sufficient funding for
operations.  Some observers have expressed concerns or doubts about the Coast Guard’s
ability to finance key equipment modernization programs, such as its Deepwater
acquisition project for replacing aging cutters and aircraft.3  Inefficient use of available
resources by the Coast Guard does not appear to be a significant contributor to the
problem – the Coast Guard in March 2000 received an excellent review for financial
management and stewardship of resources by the Government Performance Project of
Government Executive magazine.4  Prior to September 11, 2001, Coast Guard leaders and
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supporters attempted repeatedly to draw attention to this missions-vs.-resources situation.
They noted that the Coast Guard today is smaller than it was several years ago, even
though its responsibilities have expanded considerably over the last 25 years as a result
of substantial growth in mission areas such as counter-drug operations, alien interception,
pollution prevention, and fisheries enforcement.
Port Security.  Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, policymakers
have expressed strong concern for the security of the nation’s 361 ports, for which only
modest security procedures were in place prior to September 11, 2001.  Although the
Coast Guard is a key player in maintaining port security, other federal and local agencies
have important roles to play in port security.  Thus, while Coast Guard homeland-security
operations focus to a large degree on port security, the issue of port security encompasses
more than the Coast Guard.5
FY2003 Budget Request.  The Coast Guard says its FY2003 budget request
includes a 5-element program to improve the security of the nation’s ports, waterways and
maritime borders.  The five elements, with requested funding for new initiatives with each
element (funded mostly from the OE account), are as follows:
! Building Maritime Domain Awareness, including efforts to increase
intelligence in ports, improve information about ship passengers, crews,
and cargoes, and establish intelligence fusion centers.  ($69.4 million)
! Ensuring controlled movement of high-interest vessels, including
increased boarding and escort operations.  ($18 million)
! Enhancing presence and response operations, including increased
harbor patrols and visibility.  ($47.5 million)
! Protecting critical infrastructure and enhancing Coast Guard force
protection, including patrols and random inspections.  ($37.7 million)
! Increasing domestic and international outreach, including working
with local authorities to prepare vessel and waterfront security plans,
preparing Coast Guard anti-terrorism contingency plans, and working
with the International Maritime Organization on international maritime
security actions.  ($23.8 million)
In addition, the Coast Guard for FY2003 is requesting an increase in active-duty end
strength of 1,400 to 1,500 personnel, on top of an increase of 700 to 800 personnel for
FY2002, for a total increase across the two years of about 2,200 active-duty personnel.
The FY2003 budget also requests increasing the Coast Guard reserve end strength to
9,000 (a 1,000-person increase).
Issues for Congress
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Location of Coast Guard Within Executive Branch.  The Administration’s
proposal to create a new DHS, announced on June 6, 2002, would transfer the Coast
Guard from DoT to DHS.  The Coast Guard at the time of the proposal was the largest
federal agency proposed for incorporation into DHS.  The Administration’s proposal
mirrored some other bills introduced in Congress prior to June 6, 2002, that would
transfer the Coast Guard into a new department or agency for homeland security.  The
Administration’s plan to transfer the Coast Guard to DHS became one of the more
significant items of congressional debate on the merits of the Administration’s homeland
security reorganization proposal.
Debate prior to September 11, 2001.  The issue of where in the executive
branch the Coast Guard should be located existed prior to September 11, 2001.  During
this period, some Coast Guard supporters, noting the Coast Guard’s national defense
mission and that Coast Guard programs currently must compete for limited DoT funding
against highly popular highway and transit projects, had proposed transferring the service
to DoD.  Other observers, noting the Coast Guard’s homeland-security operations, had
proposed incorporating the service into a new department or agency for homeland security
agency.  Coast Guard leaders argued that since the Coast Guard’s operations are part
transportation-related, part law-enforcement-related, and part defense-related, the Coast
Guard will not fit perfectly into any parent department, whether that be DoT, the
Department of Justice, DoD, or a new homeland security department, and that
consequently there was no overwhelming case for transferring the Coast Guard from DoT
to some other parent department.
Debate between September 11, 2001, and June 6, 2002.  After September
11, 2001, but prior to the Administration’s June 6, 2002 announcement of its proposal to
create DHS, Coast Guard officials argued that the Coast Guard’s increased focus on
conducting expanded homeland security operations argued against the idea of transferring
the Coast Guard to another parent department because such a transfer could disrupt Coast
Guard homeland security operations at a critical time.
Debate since June 6, 2002.  Following the Administration’s announcement of
its homeland security reorganization plan, Coast Guard officials support the proposal to
transfer the Coast Guard to DHS, stating that the Coast Guard is a logical component of
the proposed Department.
Some Members of Congress have expressed concern that transferring the Coast
Guard to DHS could lead to a reduced focus on important Coast Guard missions not
directly related to homeland security, such as search and rescue, fisheries law
enforcement, and marine environmental protection.  One option for addressing this
concern would be to leave the Coast Guard in DoT.  Another would be to divide the Coast
Guard into two parts – one focused on missions relating maritime homeland security,
which would be transferred to DHS, the other focused on non-homeland-security
missions, which would remain in DoT.  The Coast Guard argues that
To maximize the Coast Guard’s effectiveness in the new Department, it is essential
that the Coast Guard remain intact[;] retain essential attributes as a military, multi-
mission, and maritime service[; and] retain the full range of Coast Guard missions.
Nearly forty percent of the Coast Guard’s current operating budget is directly related
to the core missions of the proposed Department and the remainder of our missions
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contribute indirectly to the overall security and economic viability of the nation.  The
Coast Guard is the lead federal agency for Maritime Homeland Security and we have
a game plan to protect America’s waterways and ports....
Our full range of missions, all critical to the nation, would continue to serve America
in a robust way under President Bush’s approval.... The greatest danger to any Coast
Guard mission would be to fracture the Coast Guard.  Our multi-mission assets are
critical to each of our five fundamental roles.... These roles overlap, as Maritime
Security and Maritime Safety are two sides to the same coin of protecting Americans.
The same cutters, boats, aircrafts [sic], and personnel that maintain Maritime Mobility
also provide Maritime Safety and Security as well as Protect our National Resources.
The Coast Guard has always met its full set of responsibilities, regardless of
Departmental location.6
Missions vs. Resources.  The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 increased
Coast Guard requirements for the homeland-security mission without obviously reducing
requirements for other, pre-September11, 2001 missions. (Some observers go further,
arguing that September 11, 2001, if anything, strengthened requirements for Coast Guard
counter-drug and alien migrant interception operations, since terrorists can use drug
profits to finance their activities and might try to enter the United States illegally by ship.)
Coast Guard leaders and supporters since September 11, 2001 have argued that the Coast
Guard’s budget needs to be increased at least to the point where it can make full use of
its existing ships and aircraft, and perhaps further, so as to finance an increase in size.
There appear to be few observers who oppose the general notion that the Coast Guard’s
resources will need to be increased to bring them into better alignment with the service’s
post-September 11, 2001 mission requirements.  The issue appears to center more on the
question of the size of the increase that will be needed.
Legal Authorities.  Coast Guard officials state that their legal authorities are quite
broad and are generally sufficient for conducting post-September 11, 2001 homeland-
security responsibilities.  One change that the Coast Guard is seeking would expand its
authority to enforce rules and regulations for controlling vessels in U.S. territorial waters
so that the authority extends to U.S. waters up to 12 miles from shore (the current
definition of U.S. territorial waters, adopted in 1988), rather than its current statutory
authority, which extends out only to 3 miles from shore (the pre-1988 definition of U.S.
territorial waters).  This change would be made by Section 119 of S. 1214/H.R. 3437.
Coordination With Other Agencies.  A fourth potential issue for Congress is
coordination between the Coast Guard and other government agencies.
Coordination With Navy.  The emerging homeland security concepts of
operations of the Coast Guard and Navy both view the Coast Guard as the primary service
for maritime homeland-security operations, with the Navy supporting the Coast Guard,
if needed, in specific areas where Coast Guard capabilities are very limited, such as air
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defense or antisubmarine warfare.7  Are the Coast Guard and Navy taking adequate steps
to coordinate their homeland security operations?  Have the two services reached
agreement on their respective responsibilities for maritime homeland security, and on
command relationships, doctrine, and tactics for such operations?  Are the two services
conducting sufficient joint training in this area?  Are Navy and Coast Guard systems
sufficiently interoperable to reach desired levels of coordination?
Coordination with Other Agencies.  Coast Guard officials state that although
their service has longstanding working relationships with other federal, state, local, and
Canadian agencies that contribute to maritime homeland security, coordination with these
other agencies will need to be improved.  The Administration’s proposal to create DHS
is intended in part to address this need.  One issue for Congress is how well the
Administration’s proposed organization for DHS would achieve this goal.  The Coast
Guard also supports the creation of a fully networked information environment among
interested agencies to help achieve and maintain what the Coast Guard calls “maritime
domain awareness” (MDA).  In essence, MDA refers to having a continuous
understanding of commercial shipping on a global basis, so that commercial ships of
potential concern can be identified at their foreign ports of origin, long before they begin
to approach the United States.  Coast Guard officials argue that maritime homeland
security can be significantly increased if MDA can be implemented to establish a de facto
forward line of defense in overseas ports of origin.
Legislative Activity
The two principal homeland security reorganization bills are H.R. 5005 and SA4471.
House.  The version of  H.R. 5005 reported by the House Transportation and
Infrastructure Committee included a provision that would  keep the Coast Guard in DoT.
Section 402(2) of H.R. 5005 as reported by the House Select  Committee on Homeland
Security (H.Rept. 107-609, Part 1, July 24, 2002) and as passed by the House on July 26,
2002 authorizes the transferring of Coast Guard functions, personnel, assets and
obligations to DHS, and stipulates that the Coast Guard be maintained as a distinct entity
within DHS.  Section 212 transfers the intelligence elements of the Coast Guard to the
DHS Intelligence Analysis Center.
Senate.  SA4471 is an amendment to H.R. 5005 in the nature of a substitute filed
on September 3, 2002, by Sen. Lieberman.  (See “Text Of Amendments – SA4471,”
Congressional Record, daily edition, September 3, 2002, p. S8100-S8137.)  Section
131(c)(2) of SA4471 authorizes the transferring of Coast Guard functions, personnel,
assets and obligations to DHS, and stipulates that the Coast Guard be maintained as a
distinct entity within DHS.  Section 131(e) preserves the Coast Guard’s various missions,
particularly its non-homeland security missions, and its resources for performing them.
Section 135(c)(3)(D) reserves 10 percent of certain research and development funding to
be spent by the DHS for each fiscal year through 2005 for developing maritime security
capabilities intended to minimize the possibility that Coast Guard assets would be
diverted from non-homeland security missions to maritime security missions.  
